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Abstract
This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis.
If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they
will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about
applicants. We …nd that employers are more likely to lower educa-
tional standards when an informal, more informative recruitment
channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal
in the hiring process.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper tests the educational signaling hypothesis by using informa-
tion about the hiring behavior of Dutch employers. The idea of the
test, based on Albrecht (1981), is that if education is a signal, then em-
ployers will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about
an applicant. To apply this idea, we use information about the educa-
tional requirements attached to vacancies and about the education of
the workers ultimately hired into those vacancies. That is, we compare
ex ante educational requirements with ex post educational attainments.
We also know the recruitment channels that employers used to …ll their
vacancies. We distinguish between informal and formal channels, and
we assume that informal recruitment channels provide more information
about potential new employees than formal recruitment channels do.
We …nd that a newly hired employee is more likely to have less educa-
tion than originally required if the employer hired that worker through an
informal recruitment channel. This pattern obtains in a simple contin-
gency table analysis, and it continues to hold when we use a competing
risks framework to take into account the fact that vacancies are …lled at
di¤erent rates. In the competing risks analysis, we control for vacancy
characteristics that might be associated both with the propensity to re-
lax educational requirements and with the propensity to use an informal
recruitment channel. This leads us to conclude that education is indeed
used as a signal in the hiring process.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
sketch a model to connect our test procedure to theory. We use this
model to explain our test further and to relate our method to other ap-
proaches to testing the signaling hypothesis. In Section 3, we review
the literature on search and recruitment methods. The purpose of this
section is to convince the reader that our assumption that informal re-
cruitment methods give more information than formal methods do is in
fact a reasonable one. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis. In this
section, we describe the data, we explain our competing risks framework,
and we present our results. We conclude in Section 5.
22M o d e l
Although our test procedure is intuitive, it is not immediately obvious
how to connect it to the standard signaling model (Spence 1974). The
problem is that the standard model is too extreme in the sense that in
separating equilibrium, education is a perfect predictor of productivity.
In this case, there is no value to further information, and the test pro-
cedure breaks down. No one would claim, however, that education is
a perfect signal of productivity. In order to connect our test procedure
to theory, we thus need a model in which education imperfectly signals
productivity in separating equilibrium. We now sketch such a model.
Suppose a worker’s type is de…ned by her cost of acquiring education.
To keep things simple, imagine there are two possible types, high-cost
(cH)a n dl o w - c o s t( cL). The probability a worker is type cH is p: Type is
private information, but p is common knowledge. The worker is either
high-productivity (zH) or low-productivity (zL) and does not know her
productivity until she actually works. She does, however, know that
P[zHjcL]=qL and P[zHjcH]=qH; where qL >q H: These conditional
probabilities are also known by the …rm.
The worker chooses either a high or a low level of education, s: If
s h ec h o o s e st h eh i g hl e v e l( sH), her cost is given by her type; if she
chooses the low level (sL), no cost is incurred. Low-cost types, who are
on average (but not always) more productive, thus have the lower cost of
acquiring the high level of education. The …rm observes s; so education
has the potential to be an (imperfect) signal of productivity. In addition,
education may be productivity-enhancing. We model this by assuming
that the high level of education transforms a low-productivity worker
into one who is high-productivity with probability r: Aw o r k e rw h o s e
productivity is high to begin with remains so, irrespective of her edu-
cational choice, and a low-productivity worker who chooses sL remains
low-productivity.
Suppose the …rm also observes another indicator of productivity, x;
so the …rm can condition its action on both x and s: Let Ã(s;x)=
P[zHjs;x]: The …rm chooses between two actions, Hire and Not Hire;
i.e., a = H or a = NH: It chooses a = H if Ã(s;x) ¸ Ã
¤ and a = NH
otherwise. A cuto¤ rule of this form is optimal for the …rm if delay in
3the hiring process is costly. The reservation probability, Ã
¤; equates the
expected value of accepting a worker to the expected value of continuing
the screening process.
We are interested in a separating equilibrium. In such an equilibrium,
low-cost workers choose sH while high-cost workers choose sL: Of course,
so long as x conveys some information, not all workers who choose sH
get the job nor do all workers who choose sL fail to get the job. Nor is
it the case that the …rm only hires the more productive workers. It only
does so on average.
Suppose now that we observe a …rm’s hiring behavior in two cir-
cumstances. In the …rst, x is a relatively uninformative indicator of
productivity; in the second, x is relatively informative. By “relatively
informative” we mean that for s and x such that Ã(s;x) is close to Ã
¤; a
small change in x induces a relatively large change in Ã(s;x): To see the
implications of these two di¤erent informational scenarios, it is useful to
consider the polar cases.
First, suppose x is completely uninformative, so the only information
the …rm can use in its hiring decision is the applicant’s educational at-
tainment. In this case, in separating equilibrium, workers with education
sH are hired with probability one; workers with the low level of educa-
tion are not hired. The workers who are hired are high-productivity
with probability qL +r(1¡qL); the workers who are not hired are high-
productivity with probability qH: The …rm’s hiring rule is optimal so
long as (i) qL + r(1 ¡ qL) is su¢ciently large relative to qH and (ii) p is
not too large, so that the …rm does not have to wait too long to meet a
“quali…ed” applicant. Worker decisions are optimal so long as the ben-
e…t of being hired is greater than cL but less than cH: Note that part of
the motivation for the …rm and worker decision rules is that education
is a signal (qL >q H), while part is that education adds to productivity
(with probability r).
At the other extreme, suppose x is a perfect predictor of productivity.
As in the …rst case, suppose it is optimal for type cL workers to choose
s = sH and for type cH workers to choose s = sL: At y p ecL worker
is then hired with probability qL + r(1 ¡ qL) while a type cH worker is
hired with probability qH: The bene…t of higher education for a type cL
4worker equals r(1 ¡ qL) times the value of getting the job. So long as
this bene…t exceeds cL, it is optimal for this type to choose s = sH: The
bene…t of higher education for a type cH worker equals r(1 ¡ qH) times
the value of getting the job. So long as this bene…t is less than cH,i ti s
optimal for this type to choose s = sL: In this second scenario, part of
the return to education is due to the fact that on average workers who
are ex ante more likely to be productive choose s = sH; while part of
the return is due to the productivity-enhancing e¤ect of education (as
in the …rst case, because r>0). There is, however, no signaling role
for education in this second case since the …rm observes productivity
directly.
In the …rst case, with x completely uninformative, education is a
signal and the …rm relies exclusively on this signal in its hiring decisions.
In the second case, with x completely informative, workers make the
same educational decisions as in the …rst scenario, even though education
has no signaling value. However, since the more educated workers get
the job with probability less than one, data on the …rm’s hiring process
would indicate that the …rm relies less heavily on education in this case.
It is this interaction between the extent to which the …rm relies on
education in its hiring decision and the quality of other information
about applicants that lies behind our test procedure.
In Albrecht (1981), data were available on all applicants, both the
accepted and the rejected, for positions at a single …rm. This made it
possible to examine the di¤erential e¤ect of education on the hiring prob-
ability for applicants who came via formal versus informal recruitment
channels. As in our paper, it was assumed that the …rm had relatively
less information about applicants who came via formal recruitment chan-
nels. The dataset we analyze does not have information about rejected
applicants. We do, however, have information about the stated educa-
tional requirements for vacancies, and we know whether the successful
applicants for these vacancies had the required education or not. In
terms of our model, we expect that the …rm will be more likely to relax
its educational requirement for applicants about whom it has more in-
formation. That is, we expect that educational requirements are more
likely to be relaxed for applicants who are recruited through informal
5channels.
The general idea that, when signaling is important, employer behav-
ior with respect to educational credentials should di¤er according to the
quality of alternative information available has been used as a basis for
other tests of the educational signaling hypothesis. These other tests
have focused on wages, however, rather than on the hiring decision. Un-
fortunately, some of these tests have failed to recognize that signaling
does not imply that the coe¢cient on education in a wage regression
will change with the quality of alternative information that is available
to employers. The reason is simply that employer estimates of produc-
tivity conditional on education, even when otherwise ill-informed, should
be unbiased. Two tests that distinguish between situations in which em-
ployers are well-informed versus ill-informed while avoiding this pitfall
are Riley (1979) and Altonji and Pierret (1998). Riley’s (1979) infor-
mational distinction is between “screened” versus “unscreened” occupa-
tions, while Altonji and Pierret (1998) distinguish between new entrants
t ot h el a b o rf o r c ev e r s u sm o r ee x p e r i e n c e dw o r k e r s . 1
3 Search and Recruitment Methods
Employers use a variety of search methods to try to …ll their vacan-
cies, and workers use several search methods to try to …nd employment.
Table 1 shows the use of search channels in the Netherlands in the mid-
1980’s by employers with vacancies and by job seekers. Informal search
methods, advertisements, and the employment o¢ce were the most com-
monly used methods; of these, advertisements were the most frequently
used channel for both workers and employers. Among job seekers, em-
ployed workers used informal search channels and the employment o¢ce
less frequently than they used advertisements while unemployed work-
ers used the employment o¢ce more than they used informal channels.
The average number of search channels used by employers and employed
1There are other approaches to testing the signaling hypothesis that are not based
on informational distinctions of the sort that we are exploiting. For example, Lang
and Kropp (1986) use the fact that compulsory school attendance laws di¤er across
states in the U.S. Their idea is that if education is a signal, then an attendance law
that forces low-ability workers to increase their educational attainment will lead high-
ability workers to undertake further education in order to distinguish themselves.
6workers was about two; unemployed workers used approximately three
di¤erent search channels.
Informal search channels are those that rely on word-of-mouth or
some other “informal” method of contact.2 F o rw o r k e r s ,i n f o r m a ls e a r c h
methods include checking with friends or relatives. For employers, infor-
mal search methods include checking with friends, relatives or incumbent
personnel. Employers often strongly prefer informal recruitment chan-
nels: they are low cost, they provide good initial screening, and they
tend to produce applicants from the neighborhood in which the …rm
is located. Informal channels also typically give potential applicants
more information than an advertisement can, which may improve the
quality of the match between worker and job. Formal recruitment chan-
nels have their own advantages and disadvantages. State employment
services have no direct costs, but there are frequent complaints about
sluggishness and poor screening, which suggests that the indirect costs
are quite high. Advertising is expensive for the employer but provides
low-cost information about the existence and location of a vacancy to
a large number of job seekers. Advertisements generally attract many
applicants, but often few are suitable for the vacant job.
There have been some studies on the use of particular recruitment
channels by employers. Barron and Mellow (1982) focus on the use
of the employment o¢ce. They conclude that many employers do not
use public employment o¢ces because many unemployed workers who
register with these o¢ces do so simply because it is a requirement for
collecting unemployment bene…ts. The motivation of workers using this
search channel seems to be lower on average than that of workers coming
via other channels. Even though the employment o¢ce is an inexpensive
source of applicants, employers have to spend more to select among
these candidates. Roper (1988) …nds that informal search is the most
productive channel for …rms in terms of expected vacancy duration, and
Van Ours and Ridder (1992, 1993) …nd that advertisements attract more
applicants but do not …ll vacancies more quickly. In a related vein, Van
2Montgomery (1991) presents an equilibrium model in which both workers and
…rms choose between formal and informal hiring channels. According to Montgomery,
employee referral serves as a useful screening device.
7Ours and Ridder (1991) study the relationship between hiring standards
and characteristics of new employees. They conclude that employers
stick closer to educational requirements than to experience requirements
and that education and experience requirements are not substitutes in
the hiring process.
>From our point of view the most important di¤erence between for-
mal and informal search methods is that informal search generates more
information to employers. This is consistent with results from several
studies using Dutch data. In particular, Lindeboom, Van Ours and
Renes (1993) …nd that informal search channels are very e¤ective in
matching workers and vacancies. Russo, Rietveld, Nijkamp and Gorter
(2000) …nd that informal recruitment channels have the capacity to
screen candidates on the grounds of their ability.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Empirical Framework
The data we use are from a Dutch vacancy survey, which is described
in detail in Van Ours and Ridder (1992). The vacancy survey was held
in two stages. First, employers were asked about the characteristics of
their vacancies. About four months later, employers were questioned
about the vacancies that were …lled in the meantime. Our sample con-
tains information about 621 vacancies, of which 444 were …lled between
the dates of the two stages while 177 were still open at the second date.
For every vacancy, we know the duration at the …rst date and either the
date at which it was …lled or the duration at the second date. From the
…rst stage of the survey, we know the size of the …rm and some charac-
teristics of the vacancy, such as education and experience requirements,
the occupation to which the vacancy pertains, and whether or not the
vacancy was for a full-time job. For the vacancies that were …lled, we
know the educational level of the newly hired worker and we know which
recruitment channel was used. A description of all the variables we use
is given in the Appendix.
We assume that educational requirements have been adjusted down-
ward if the educational level of a newly hired employee is lower than
8the educational level originally required for the vacancy …lled by this
employee. A …rst impression of the relationship between recruitment
channel and adjustment of educational requirements can be derived from
the contingency table presented as Table 2. The educational standard
was adjusted downward for 24% of the 126 …lled vacancies for which an
informal recruitment channel was used. Such an adjustment was made
for only 13% of the 318 …lled vacancies for which a formal recruitment
channel was used. The null hypothesis of independence between recruit-
ment channel and adjustment of educational requirements is rejected at
the 5% level. The Â2 from the contingency table is equal to 7.53 (critical
Â2=3.84). At …rst glance, it thus appears that education is indeed a
signal that is less relevant when other information is available.
However, the relationship between recruitment channel and adjust-
ment of educational standards may also be caused by di¤erences in ob-
served or unobserved characteristics of …rms or vacancies. If, for ex-
ample, large …rms are more likely to use formal recruitment channels
and are more strict about their hiring standards, then there is no causal
relationship between recruitment channel and the adjustment of edu-
cational standards. To correct for the e¤ects of observed and unob-
served characteristics we estimated a competing risks duration model
with four risks: adjustment and informal recruitment, adjustment and
formal recruitment, non-adjustment and informal recruitment and non-
adjustment and formal recruitment.
The hazard rates are speci…ed as
µj;k(t;x;v)=e x p ( x0¯j + ¸jd1 + vj;k);k=1 ;2; (1)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, d1 is a dummy variable
which is one in the time interval after 1 month3, v an unobserved compo-
nent, ¯ is a vector of coe¢cients, ¸ a coe¢cient for duration dependence
and j is an indicator of type of exit (risk), j = 1,..,4.4
3Van Ours and Ridder (1992, 1993) conclude that employers use a non-sequential
search strategy. Employers form a pool of applicants just after the vacancy has been
posted and they select a suitable applicant from this pool. To account for this we
allow the hazard rates to have a di¤erent value after the …rst month.
41 = Required education downward adjusted, informal recruitment channel; 2 =
9We assume the heterogeneity components follow a discrete distribu-
tion with two points of support:
h(vj;1)=p and h(vj;2)=1¡ p: (2)
The points of support and the probability p are parameters to be esti-
mated. We reparametrize p as exp(°)=[1 + exp(°)]:
The …rms that provided information about their vacancies were ap-
proached twice. The …rst time all vacancies were open, with incom-
plete vacancy durations t1. After about four months the …rms were
approached for a second interview. From this second interview we know
whether the vacancy was …lled in these four months and, if so, when it
was …lled. Furthermore, we know which recruitment channel was used
and we know whether or not the level of education of the hired worker
was equal to or lower than the required education. The date at which
the vacancy was …lled is given by t2 (so the total duration is t1 + t2).
In constructing the likelihood, we use the conditional distribution of the
residual vacancy duration t2 given the incomplete duration t1 and the
type of exit j: The likelihood contribution if a vacancy is …lled at a known
date t2 through exit j is
P2
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As explanatory variables we use the variables described in the Appendix.
4.2 Parameter estimates
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3a. Many of the estimates
Required education downward adjusted, formal recruitment channel; 3 = Required
education non-adjusted, informal recruitment channel; 4 = Required education non-
adjusted, formal recruitment channel.
10do not di¤er from zero at conventional levels of signi…cance. None of
the estimated coe¢cients on …rm size, full-time, and production work-
ers is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; that is, these variables appear to
a¤ect neither the speed at which vacancies are …lled nor the path by
which these vacancies are …lled. Only one of the estimated coe¢cients
on experience is signi…cantly less than zero. The interpretation of this
coe¢cient estimate is that vacancies for which experience is required are
less likely to be …lled through a formal recruitment channel by a worker
who has a lower level of education than required. All of the estimated
coe¢cients on required education di¤er signi…cantly from zero. Further-
more, it appears that the probability that educational requirements are
adjusted is higher if the level of required education is higher. The coef-
…cients on the dummy for commercial workers are all positive and are
somewhat higher for adjusted education. This suggests that vacancies
for commercial workers have shorter durations and are more likely to
have educational requirements downward adjusted, but there appears to
be no di¤erence in the use of formal or informal recruitment channels.
We found some evidence of unobserved heterogeneity but no evidence for
duration dependence. The estimate for ° indicates that conditional on
the observed characteristics there are two types of vacancies that di¤er
in the rates at which they are …lled. The …rst group, which comprises
about 20% of the vacancies, is more likely to be …lled via an informal
recruitment channel and to adjust educational requirements downward.
For the second group, since v2 ¡v1 = ¡1 for exit 1, the transition rate
for this type of exit is zero. The second group of vacancies is more likely
to be …lled without adjusting educational requirements and via a formal
recruitment channel than is the …rst group.
If we restrict our model to a speci…cation without unobserved het-
erogeneity and duration dependence, the log likelihood value drops by
4.6 points (Table 3b). From this we conclude that we can ignore both
unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence.5 Ac o m p a r i s o no f
5A formal Likelihood Ratio test is problematic since one of the parameters (°)
is not identi…ed under the null hypothesis. The di¤erence in the values of the log-
likelihoods is rather small considering there are 4 duration dependence parameters
and, apart from °; there are 4 unobserved heterogeneity parameters (vj;2): Note that
the Likelihood Ratio test statistic is 9.2, while the critical Â2¡value for 8 degrees of
11Tables 3a and 3b shows that the estimates of the coe¢cients on the
…rm and vacancy characteristics are hardly a¤ected. Table 3c shows the
parameter estimates if we drop the four variables with mostly insigni…-
cant coe¢cients. The log likelihood value drops by 7.5 points. Since the
Likelihood Ratio statistic is 15.0 and the critical Â2-value for 16 degrees
of freedom is 26.3 we cannot reject the hypothesis that these variables
do not a¤ect the process by which vacancies are …lled.
The most interesting question is whether there is a relationship be-
tween adjusting educational requirements and the recruitment channel
through which the vacancy is …lled. We investigated this by imposing
independence, using the speci…cation without unobserved heterogeneity
or duration dependence and restricting ourselves to the variables with
signi…cant coe¢cients:
¯4 ¡ ¯3 = ¯2 ¡ ¯1
v4;1 ¡ v3;1 = v2;1 ¡ v1;1 (5)
As shown in Table 3d, this restriction causes the log likelihood to drop 5.3
points. The Likelihood Ratio statistic comparing the two results is equal
to 10.6, which is signi…cantly larger than the critical Â2-value of 7.8 for 3
degrees of freedom. Therefore, even conditional on the characteristics of
the vacancy, the adjustment of educational standards is not independent
of the recruitment channel.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We conclude that when employers recruit new employees, they are more
likely to deviate from their stated educational requirements if there is
information from other sources, in particular, when an informal recruit-
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136 Appendix: Description of variables
All variables are related to individual vacancies. The variables are de-
…ned as follows:
- Firm size: natural logarithm of the number of employees at the …rm
- Experience: dummy variable equal to 1 if work experience is required
and 0 otherwise
- Full-time job: dummy variable equal to 1 if the vacancy is advertised
for a full-time job and 0 otherwise
- Required education: level of required education; value 1 if no educa-
tion is required, value 2 if lower vocational or lower general education
is required, value 3 if intermediate vocational or intermediate general
education is required, value 4 if higher vocational or academic educa-
tion is required. If no education is required, there can be no downward
adjustment, so we remove this type of vacancy from the sample
- Production workers: dummy variable equal to 1 if the vacancy was for
a production worker and 0 otherwise
- Commercial workers: dummy variable equal to 1 if the vacancy was for
a service, clerical or commercial job and 0 otherwise
Table A1 Minima, maxima and means
Minimum Maximum Mean
Firm size 2 9 5.1
Experience 0 1 0.78
Full-time 0 1 0.93
Required education 2 4 3.1
Production workers 0 1 0.06
Commerical workers 0 1 0.38
The questionnaire distinguishes among the following recruitment chan-
nels:
1. Internal recruitment
2. Recruitment with help of incumbent employees
3 .R e c r u i t m e n tw i t hh e l po fr e l a t i o n so ft h e… r m
4. Recruitment through a temporary employment agency
5. Recruitment through the public employment o¢ce
146. Advertisement in newspaper
7. Recruitment through open applications
8. Recruitment through school/education
9. Other recruitment channels
We consider recruitment channels 1-4 to be informal recruitment chan-
nels, whereas the remaining channels are considered to be formal recruit-
ment channels.
15Table 1 - Search channels used by employers and job seekersa)
Employers Employed Unemployed
workers workers
Informal 63% 29% 50%
Advertisement 66% 85% 78%
Employment o¢ce 44% 12% 52%
Others 33% 33% 27%
Average # of channels 2.1 1.8 2.8
a) The information about employers’ search is from the OSA vacancy
survey of November 1986; the information about job search is from the
OSA labor force panel survey of October 1986.
Source: Lindeboom, Van Ours and Renes (1993)
16Table 2 - Filled vacancies by recruitment channel and adjust-
ment of educational requirements
a. Numbers
Educational requirements Recruitment channel
Informal Formal Total
Adjusted downwards 30 42 72
No downward adjustment 96 276 372
Total 126 318 444
b. Column percentages
Educational requirements Recruitment channel
Informal Formal Total
Adjusted downwards 23.8 13.2 16.2
No downward adjustment 76.2 86.8 83.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
17Table 3 - Parameter estimatesa)
a. Full model
Required education Adjusted downward No downward adjustment
Recruitment channel Informal Formal Informal Formal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of job
Firm size -0.20 (1.0) -0.12 (0.8) -0.04 (0.4) 0.06 (0.9)
Experience 0.95 (1.5) -0.08 (0.1) -0.28 (1.0) -0.49 (2.4)¤¤
Full-time -0.10 (0.1) 0.14 (0.1) -0.31 (0.7) -0.35 (1.2)
Required education 0.86 (1.8)¤ 0.73 (1.7)¤ -0.72 (4.4)¤¤ -0.38 (3.2)¤¤
Production workers -b) -0.08 (0.1) -0.25 (0.4) 0.48 (1.3)
Commercial workers 0.91 (1.7)¤ 0.72 (2.0)¤¤ 0.42 (1.8)¤ 0.38 (2.3)¤¤
Duration e¤ects
1+ months 0.27 (0.3) -0.13 (0.2) -0.06 (0.1) 0.40 (1.3)
Heterogeneity
v1 -5.78 (2.5)¤¤ -5.67 (3.2)¤¤ -0.58 (0.7) -2.38 (2.6)¤¤
v2 ¡ v1 ¡1 -1.12 (0.7) 0.35 (0.5) 1.70 (2.7)¤¤
° -1.34 (1.9)¤
-Log likelihood 1436.2
b. No duration dependence or unobserved heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm size -0.07 (0.4) -0.07 (0.6) -0.04 (0.4) 0.04 (0.9)
Experience 0.17 (0.3) -0.33 (0.8) -0.22 (0.9) -0.32 (2.1)¤¤
Full-time -0.27 (0.3) -0.03 (0.0) -0.25 (0.6) -0.18 (0.8)
Required education 0.24 (0.7) 0.72 (2.6)¤¤ -0.60 (4.2)¤¤ -0.17 (1.9)¤
Production workers -b) -0.23 (0.2) -0.24 (0.4) 0.54 (2.1)¤¤
Commercial workers 0.75 (1.9)¤ 0.66 (2.1)¤¤ 0.42 (1.9)¤ 0.50 (3.7)¤¤
v1 -4.61 (3.4)¤¤ -5.68 (4.1)¤¤ -0.57 (0.9) -1.28 (3.4)¤¤
-Log likelihood 1440.8
18c. Restricted number of variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Required education 0.20 (0.7) 0.65 (2.6)¤¤ -0.66 (4.9)¤¤ -0.22 (2.6)¤
Commercial workers 0.75 (2.0)¤¤ 0.70 (2.2)¤¤ 0.48 (2.2)¤¤ 0.47 (3.7)¤¤




Required education 0.21 (1.0) 0.54 (2.8)¤¤ -0.57 (4.6)¤¤
Commercial workers 0.74 (2.7)¤¤ 0.71 (2.8)¤¤ 0.50 (2.5)¤¤
v1 -5.44 (7.4)¤¤ -5.53 (7.9)¤¤ -1.18 (3.1)¤¤
-Log likelihood 1453.6
a) absolute t-statistics in parentheses;
b) because of lack of observations we could not estimate this coe¢cient
¤ (¤¤) = signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at 10% (5%) level
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